Espanjalainen Armada Espanjan merivoimien laivasto

Espanjan armada, jota kutsutaan myös Armada tai Invincible Armada, Espanjan Armada Española tai Armada Invencible, suuri laivasto, jonka Espanjan kuningas Philip II lähetti vuonna 1588 hyökkäämään Englantiin yhdessä Flanderista peräisin olevan espanjalaisen armeijan kanssa. Englannin yrityksissä hylätä tämä laivasto koski ensimmäisiä meritaisteluita, jotka oli taisteltu kokonaan raskailla aseilla, ja Espanjan yrityksen epäonnistuminen pelasti Englannin ja Alankomaiden mahdollisesta imeytymisestä Espanjan valtakuntaan.

Sir Francis Drake: Espanjan ryhmän epäonnistuminen

”Vuoteen 1586 mennessä tiedettiin, että Philip II valmisteli laivastoa nk. Englannin yritykseksi ja että hänellä oli siunaus

.

Hyökkäyksen tausta

Philip oli pitkään harkinnut yritystä palauttaa roomalaiskatolinen usko Englantiin, ja Englannin piratit Espanjan kauppaa ja omaisuutta vastaan ​​tarjosivat hänelle lisää provokaatiota. Nonsuchin sopimus (1585), jolla Englanti sitoutui tukemaan Alankomaiden kapinallisia Espanjan hallitusta vastaan, sekä Sir Francis Draken vahingolliset hyökkäykset Espanjan kauppaa vastaan ​​Karibialla vuosina 1585–86, vakuuttivat lopulta Philipin välittömään hyökkäykseen Englantiin.. Hän päätti käyttää 30 000 joukkoa, jotka kuuluvat Alankomaiden Espanjan regentin, Parman herttuan veteraaniarmeijaan, pää hyökkäysvoimana ja lähettää Espanjasta riittävästi merivoimia voittaaksesi tai estääkseen Englannin laivaston ja puhdistaakseen Doverin salmen Parman armeijan siirtymiseksi Flanderista Kaakkois-Englantiin.

Espanjan laivasto

After nearly two years’ preparation and prolonged delays, the Armada sailed from Lisbon in May 1588 under the command of the duke of Medina-Sidonia, a replacement for Spain’s most distinguished admiral, the marquess de Santa Cruz, who had died in February. Medina-Sidonia was an experienced administrator who proved to be resolute and capable in action, but he had relatively little sea experience. The Spanish fleet consisted of about 130 ships with about 8,000 seamen and possibly as many as 19,000 soldiers. About 40 of these ships were line-of-battle ships, the rest being mostly transports and light craft. The Spaniards were conscious that even their best ships were slower than those of the English and less well armed with heavy guns, but they counted on being able to force boarding actions if the English offered battle, after which the superiority of the Spanish infantry would prove decisive.

• 

• 

The English fleet

The English fleet was under the command of Charles Howard, 2nd Baron Howard of Effingham; he was no more experienced an admiral than Medina-Sidonia but was a more effective leader. His second in command was Sir Francis Drake. The English fleet at one time or another included nearly 200 ships, but during most of the subsequent fighting in the English Channel it numbered less than 100 ships, and at its largest it was about the same size as the Spanish fleet. No more than 40 or so were warships of the first rank, but the English ships were unencumbered by transports, and even their smallest vessels were fast and well armed for their size. The English placed great reliance on artillery; their ships carried few soldiers but had many more and heavier guns than the Spanish ships. With these guns, mounted in faster and handier ships, they planned to stand off and bombard the Spanish ships at long range.

Opening of the naval conflict

Gales forced the Armada back to the port of A Coruña (in northern Spain) for refitting, and it finally got under way again in July. The Armada was first sighted by the English off Lizard Point, in Cornwall, on July 29 (July 19, Old Style). The larger part of the English fleet was then at Plymouth, dead to leeward, but by a neat maneuver was able to get to the windward, or upwind, side of the enemy (i.e., west of the Armada, given the prevailing west winds) and hence gain the tactical initiative. In three encounters (off Plymouth, July 31 [July 21]; off Portland Bill, August 2 [July 23]; and off the Isle of Wight, August 4 [July 25]), the English harassed the Spanish fleet at long range and easily avoided all attempts to bring them to close action but were unable to inflict serious damage on the Spanish formation.

The Armada reached the Strait of Dover on August 6 (July 27) and anchored in an exposed position off Calais, France. The English also anchored, still to windward (west of the Armada), and were reinforced by a squadron that had been guarding the narrow seas. The first certain news of the Armada’s advance reached Parma in Flanders the same day, and he at once began embarking his troops in their invasion craft, but the process required six days, and the Armada had no safe port in which to wait for him nor any means of escorting his small craft across the coastal shallows where Dutch and English warships cruised to intercept them. This defect in Spanish strategy was to prove disastrous.

Defeat of the Armada

At midnight on August 7–8 (July 28–29), the English launched eight fire ships before the wind and tide into the Spanish fleet, forcing the Spanish ships to cut or slip their cables (thus losing their anchors) and stand out to sea to avoid catching fire. The Spanish ships’ formation was thus completely broken. At dawn on the 8th the English attacked the disorganized Spanish ships off Gravelines, and a decisive battle ensued. The English ships now closed to effective range and were answered largely with small arms. The Spanish ships’ heavy guns were not mounted, nor were Spanish gunners trained to reload in action. They sustained serious damage and casualties without being able to reply effectively. Three Spanish ships were sunk or driven ashore, and others were badly battered. At the same time, the English were obliged by shortage of ammunition to break off the action and follow at a distance. By the morning of August 9 (July 30), the prevailing westerly winds were driving the Spaniards toward the shoals of the Zeeland banks. At the last minute, however, the wind shifted and allowed them to shape a safe course to the northward. Both the west wind and the English fleet now prevented the Armada from rejoining Parma, and it was forced to make the passage back to Spain around the northern tip of Scotland. The English fleet turned back in search of supplies when the Armada passed the Firth of Forth and there was no further fighting, but the long voyage home through the autumn gales of the North Atlantic proved fatal to many of the Spanish ships. Whether through battle damage, bad weather, shortage of food and water, or navigational error, some ships foundered in the open sea while others were driven onto the west coast of Ireland and wrecked. Only 60 ships are known to have reached Spain, many of them too badly damaged to be repaired, and perhaps 15,000 men perished. The English lost several hundred, perhaps several thousand, men to disease but sustained negligible damage and casualties in action.

Significance

The defeat of the Armada saved England from invasion and the Dutch Republic from extinction, while dealing a heavy blow to the prestige of the greatest European power of the age. Tactically, the Armada action has enduring historical significance as the first major naval gun battle under sail and as the moment from which, for over two and a half centuries, the gun-armed sailing warship dominated the seas.